I. INTRODUCTION
International agreements to control transboundary externalities have received increasing attention from policy makers and scholars, driven by the acknowledgement of global problems such as climate change or ozone layer depletion as well as more regional problems associated with acid rain. A common feature of these international treaties is that they are generally designed to control emissions of one single pollutant. For example, the Kyoto Protocol aims at reducing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions, the main cause of global warming, while more conventional air pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide [SO 2 ], nitrogen oxide [NO x ], or volatile organic compounds [VOCs] ) are the targets of international treaties that follow the 1979 Convention on LongRange Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP).
In reality, a single source of emissions is typically composed of multiple pollutants that simultaneously cause global and/or more regional environmental damages. For example, Barker (1993, 9) calculated that in the United Kingdom, the burning of fossil fuels is responsible for, apart from CO 2 , over 99% of SO 2 and NO x , 91% of particulate matter, and 38% of VOC emissions, which implies more regional or local environmental damages (e.g., acid rain, degradation of ambient air quality). 1 As they are emitted by a single source, existing abatement technologies may have joint effects on this multiplicity of pollutants. These effects can go in both directions. In this paper, we consider the case of acid rain control and CO 2 emissions. Different options are available to reduce SO 2 emissions. Some of these options, like switching from burning coal to burning natural gas, would imply SO 2 as well as CO 2 emissions reductions. 2 On the other hand, scrubbers installed in power plants to neutralize SO 2 emissions use energy and therefore lead to more CO 2 emissions. 3 In the same way, switching from high-sulfur to lowsulfur coals can lower SO 2 emissions. These low-sulfur coals have a lower heat value, so more coal must be burned to generate a given amount of output, leading to higher CO 2 emissions (Barker et al. 1997 ).
An international treaty foreseeing abatement of one of these air pollutants, such as SO 2 , may also have a significant ancillary im-pact on CO 2 , and, as a consequence, on the design of future international climate agreements. Indeed, these ancillary effects will alter the cost-benefit calculations underlying policy targets. The objective of this paper is twofold: (1) estimate the impact on CO 2 emissions of international treaties that follow the 1979 LRTAP Convention and that address conventional air pollutants such as SO 2 , NO x , or VOCs, and (2) derive some implications in terms of climate change policies Identifying the effect of an agreement raises two problems: (1) endogeneity of the treaty ratification variables resulting from omitted variables or reverse causality (i.e., countries' incentives to ratify agreements may depend on their emissions levels) and (2) timing effects of the treaty (i.e., effects may start early or be bunched at a future date). As we analyze the effect of multiple treaties, the identification challenge becomes higher because they overlap in time and in terms of signatory countries. There may not be sufficient heterogeneity between them to identify their individual effects.
We deal with the problem of endogeneity by instrumenting the decision to ratify an air pollution agreement using the status of the death penalty as a proxy for universalism or progressivism. We deal with timing effects and time and membership overlap issues together. Since agreements that follow the 1979 LRTAP Convention are relatively similar in terms of their timing and signatory countries, it is impossible to identify the effects of these agreements individually. To overcome these issues, we group LRTAP treaties into a single variable. The idea behind this assumption is that agreements related to the same air pollution issue (i.e., here acid rain) are linked and should have a similar impact on CO 2 emissions.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to estimate empirically the impact on CO 2 emissions of various treaties not specifically targeted toward these emissions. Interestingly, LRTAP treaties are associated with statistically significant CO 2 emissions reductions. Even if these reductions are nonnegligible, they are not large enough to completely forego negotiations of an international climate agreement. However, the ancillary effect identified in this paper suggests that LRTAP treaties may have a role to play in future climate policies. For example, these two pollution issues could be tackled together at the international level in order to take the ancillary benefits into account and potentially achieve extra CO 2 emissions reductions.
The approach used in this paper differs from that in the existing empirical literature on international environmental agreements (Murdoch and Sandler 1997; Bratberg, Tjøtta, and Øines 2005; Aakvik and Tjøtta 2011) by considering multiple non-CO 2 -specific agreements at the same time, instead of focusing on a single one. It points out the limitations of studying the effects of each treaty in isolation. In line with this idea, Egger and Wamser (2012) challenge the existing literature on preferential agreements, which focuses on one policy area, by providing evidence of an important overlap in the conclusion of different types of preferential economic integration agreements.
Some papers deal with potential interactions between air pollution issues, but they are either purely theoretical models or numerical simulations, for example, integrated cost-benefit analyses. Ambec and Coria (2013) demonstrate that the optimal policy instrument (e.g., taxes, tradable permits, or a mix between the two) in the presence of two pollutants depends on whether there are economies or diseconomies of scope in the joint abatement cost function. Caplan and Silva (2005) consider multiple pollutants causing regional and global damages and characterized by abatement externalities (i.e., emissions abatement of one pollutant has an ancillary impact on the emissions of the other pollutant). They show that the use of a global permit market to control CO 2 emissions that would be linked with regional permit markets to control regional pollutants may lead to a Pareto superior outcome.
Some papers using numerical simulations (Burtraw et al. 2001; Driscoll et al. 2015) analyze a question that is the mirror of ours: they look at the impact of greenhouse gas mitigation policies on conventional air pollutants and air quality and find a positive relationship. Bollen et al. (2009) study the link between climate change policies and policies designed to reduce local pollutants (e.g., particulate matter) and conclude that combining both policies achieves extra CO 2 emissions reductions that are higher than what follows from the sum of the application of either policy alone. However, in their model, abatement of local pollutants does not generate ancillary CO 2 emissions reductions. Our paper thus provides an additional argument in favor of combining both policies.
II. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
The aim of this paper is to study whether a country's participation in a non CO 2 -specific air pollution agreement has an impact on the level of CO 2 emissions of that country. In this section, we first describe our emissions and air pollution treaties data. We then turn to the identification issues raised by our question.
Data
We use a panel dataset that covers 150 countries and 38 years . Data on CO 2 emissions (in kilotons) come from the World Development Indicator (WDI) Dataset (World Bank 2012). 4 These data include only CO 2 emissions from energy-related sources (approximately 70% of total anthropogenic CO 2 emissions, see Stern 2006) . 5 A single source of CO 2 emissions is generally also responsible for other air pollutant emissions. The typical examples are the socalled conventional air pollutants, for example, SO 2 , NO x , or VOCs (Barker 1993) . To select the international agreements targeting air pollutants released with CO 2 emissions in most industrial processes, we refer to the International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project. 6 It provides for each country a list of the environmental agreements in which the country is involved, with the sig- 4 See http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators. 5 Note that those data do not take into account CO 2 emissions/removals from land use, land use change, and forestry (IEA 2010). We will try to control for this in the sensitivity analysis, in Section V. 6 Version 2012.1, see http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php? file = version.htm&query = static. nature, ratification, and entry into force dates and when relevant the withdrawal date. 7 In the IEA database, the agreements of interest for this analysis belong to the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution lineage, which consists of one initial convention, eight protocols, and 15 amendments that are targeted to conventional air pollutants responsible for acid rain or degradations in ambient air quality.
This lineage started with the 1979 LRTAP Convention, which followed increasing concerns by policy makers about the harmful effect of transboundary pollution caused by SO 2 or NO x emissions that can travel some hundreds of kilometers before deposition. This initial convention served as a basis for eight follow-up protocols and a series of amendments. In our analysis, we cannot include all these treaties because they are not all comparable. We include only those that satisfy the three following criteria: (1) the objective of the treaty is the reduction of emissions of some air pollutant, (2) the treaty includes explicit quantified emissions reduction targets, and (3) the treaty should involve the country (i.e., it should not rely on the tacit acceptance procedure). 8 The 15 amendments rely on the tacit acceptance procedure and are thus deleted (these are mainly technical modifications of the original treaty). The initial 1979 LRTAP Convention is also dropped because it does not include explicit targets. It only provides for the establishment of institutions entitled to negotiate the subsequent protocols. For the same reason, the 1984 monitoring and evaluation protocol EMEP, which requires only that signatories report their emissions to the treaty secretariat, is also dropped. We are left with seven treaties related to air pollution that in-7 A treaty is defined as "an intergovernmental document intended as legally binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing human impacts on natural resources." A description of the database is given by Mitchell (2003) . 8 This procedure is used to adopt urgently needed amendments to international environmental agreements. The body that adopts this amendment at the same time fixes a specific time within which the parties will have the opportunity to express either their acceptance or rejection or to remain silent. In case of silence the amendment is considered as accepted by the party. clude emissions reductions targets for ratifying countries. Details on these agreements can be found in Table 1 . We will assume that an agreement's year of ratification in national parliaments is the point in time from which this agreement has an impact on emissions. Ratification is preferred to signature because ratification involves political parties, the media, and the general public, while the signature of an agreement has no immediate political relevance. This choice is in line with other empirical analyses of international environmental agreements (e.g., Bratberg, Tjøtta, Øines 2005; Aichele and Felbermayr 2012) : there exists some anecdotal evidence that countries have engaged in policy initiatives after the ratification of an agreement and before its entry into force. Figure 1 shows the number of tons of CO 2 per capita emitted by each country as a function of the number of ratified LRTAP agreements by this country for the years 1985, 1995, and 2005 . Among the 150 countries of the sample, there is a lot of heterogeneity in terms of ratification behavior. Some countries, like China, did not ratify any agreement during the sample period. The United States and the United Kingdom ratified, respectively, three and six treaties in 2005. In general, European countries are the ones that have ratified the largest number of agreements.
The gap in the number of ratifications between the United States and the United Kingdom has increased sharply since 1995. Figure  1 also shows that only the United Kingdom has reduced its emissions between 1985 and 2005 (i.e., the period during which LRTAP treaties have been ratified). This is a reduction of about 9% over the period. Looking at the data, a similar pattern arises for other European countries. In the United States, emissions first increased between 1985 and 1995 and then decreased by only 4% between 1995 and 2005. China's emissions increased sharply during this period, while the number of agreements ratified by this country remained at zero. From Figure 1 , one might believe that it is because the United Kingdom and other European countries have ratified many treaties that they were able to reduce their emissions, while China and the United States still accounted for approximately 40% of total world emissions in 2008.
Identification Strategy
The first insights from Figure 1 do not account for the fact that the changes in the emissions behavior can be due to spuriousness: FIGURE 1 CO 2 Emissions (in Tons per Capita) and Number of LRTAP Treaties Ratified in 1985 , 1995 other variables can explain the emissions behavior of the ratifiers. In addition to confounding effects, we need to deal with four problems when identifying the effects of multiple agreements on CO 2 emissions: (1) time and membership overlap (is there sufficient variation in terms of treaties' timing and signatory countries), (2) timing effects (the effect of an agreement does not necessarily occur immediately after its ratification), (3) persistence of CO 2 emissions (due to the substantial inertia of some of CO 2 , it is plausible to assume that this year's CO 2 emissions are dependent on the CO 2 emissions of previous years), and (4) endogeneity of a treaty ratification. We detail below how we overcome these issues.
Controlling for Confounding Effects
Spuriousness can be checked for by making use of control variables. The following model examines how CO 2 emissions react to the ratification of air pollution agreements, controlling for other variables:
In equation [1] , i denotes the country and t the year. Variables are defined as follows: is the log of total CO 2 emissions log(CO ) 2 it of country i in year t (in kilotons). 9 is the α i country fixed effect, is the time fixed effect. δ t These fixed effects control for unobservable country-heterogeneity and common timevarying effects that could affect emissions (Hsiao 1986) . Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is needed to capture factors such as country-specific technology, regulation or ideology, or world business cycles. The variable of interest is a dummy variable,
where k is the reference number of the agreement in Table 1 , defined as 10 9 Due to our log specification, the coefficients would have remained unchanged by taking CO 2 emissions per capita instead of total CO 2 emissions as the dependent variable. The only exception would have been the coefficient of the control variable Population.
10 By using a within-analysis rather than a between-analysis, we may underestimate the effect of treaties on CO 2 emissions. We also run a pooled regression (using some additional control variables) and find stronger results. However, since time-invariant omitted variables that may affect 1 if country i has ratified the k agreement k by time t − 1 X = .
it − 1 Ά 0 o t h e r w i s e
As treaties are not systematically ratified on the first of January of year t, we consider that a treaty ratified in t − 1 will have an impact on CO 2 emissions from year t. is the coef-β ficient of interest. It represents the yearly average effect of the ratification of an agreement k by country i on this country's emissions compared to business-as-usual emissions after controlling for a set of covariates. This coefficient may be positive or negative depending on the options used to curb conventional air pollutants (e.g., scrubbers or fuel switching).
is the matrix containing the control Z it variables. Summary statistics for these control variables are presented in Appendix Table A1 . Data are available from the WDI Database (World Bank 2012) and the Polity IV Database. The first economic factor that we include as a control variable is total GDP. The GDP data are reported in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. We expect a significant positive relationship between GDP and emissions. The intuition is simple: a higher economic activity induces, ceteris paribus, a higher level of pollution due to increased resource use and waste generation (Panayotou 1997; Stern 2002) . 11 We also include the GDP growth rate, to account for the short-term variations in the economic activity (business cycles). Indeed, following van Vuuren and Riahi (2008) , economic growth is expected to have both a positive effect on CO 2 emissions (due to the increase in energy demand) and a negative effect (due to the improvement in energy efficiency).
Following the international trade literature (e.g., Copeland and Taylor 2004) , trade openness is assumed to affect the level of CO 2 emissions in two different ways: (1) increased the level of CO 2 emissions can be numerous, we prefer to concentrate on within-variations in the rest of the paper.
11 The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesizes an inverse-U-shaped relationship between a country's per capita income and its level of environmental quality (Galeotti, Lanza, and Pauli 2006; Friedl and Getzner 2003) . We test the EKC hypothesis by assuming a quadratic functional form for GDP in our specification, but the main results remain unchanged.
trade may result in more CO 2 emissions due to an enhanced economic activity, and (2) increased trade may result in reduced CO 2 emissions because countries face greater competitive pressure and become more efficient in resource use (Cole 2004) . We define trade openness as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP.
Next, we control for the total population, given that population size may contribute to CO 2 emissions through increased energy demand from the power, industry, or transport sectors (Li and Reuveny 2006; Shi 2002) . Since the composition of the economic activity may also influence the level of CO 2 emissions (Stern 2002) , we include the shares of agricultural and industrial productions in GDP. Indeed, industrial and agricultural sectors are more resource intensive than the tertiary sector. Following Neumayer (2002) , who finds a positive relationship between the number of multilateral environmental agreements ratified by a country and the level of democracy in this country, we include a Democracy indicator, available from the Polity IV Database. This indicator measures countries' institutionalized democracy. It is an additive 11-point scale (0-10), zero being the worst situation for democracy. 12 Our last control is , which logMEA it counts the number of multilateral environmental agreements other than the LRTAP treaties that country i has ratified up to year t. Since the early 1990s, there has been a growing political concern about CO 2 emissions and their impact on climate change (Barrett 2003) . Some countries have been more proactive in dealing with this issue (i.e., they have been greener), and it is reasonable to assume that countries that have ratified LRTAP treaties are also greener than those that did not. Therefore, LRTAP treaties may in fact capture growing national CO 2 emissions policies adopted in greener countries. In order to control for that, we include as a proxy for a counlogMEA it try's environmental awareness (Aichele and Felbermayr 2012) .
Time and Membership Overlap
To correctly identify the effects of the seven LRTAP treaties included in the analysis, there must be sufficient heterogeneity in terms of the timing of the agreements and in terms of the ratifying countries. To check for this, we refer to Tables 1 and 2 .
First, as shown in Table 1 , the number of ratifiers at the end of our sample period is roughly similar for all LRTAP agreements (i.e., it ranges from 19 to 29). Moreover, the identity of the ratifiers is also much the same across them. This can be seen from Table 2 , which reports the correlations between the dummies for the year 2008 (the last year k X i of our sample, and thus the year for which the membership overlap is the highest). These correlations are very high (e.g., above 0.7 for most pairs of treaties), indicating a low heterogeneity in terms of membership between LRTAP protocols. Second, as shown in Table  1 , treaties have been ratified since the end of the 1980s until 2005, but the time span between two agreements is relatively short (generally less than 5 years).
Due to this time and membership overlap, the treaty dummies will be highly cork X it − 1 related through time and across countries, and identifying accurately the effect of each individual agreement is problematic. We thus aggregate the agreements in a single variable. Our argument behind this strategy can be found in their patterns of development. Countries first agree on an umbrella convention, the 1979 LRTAP Convention, under the auspices of which all subsequent protocols and amendments are negotiated. These protocols are thus related. We create a new variable, LRTAP it − 1 , which is the sum of dummies k X it − 1 (k = 1 . . . 7) for country i in year t − 1, and we replace by LRTAP it − 1 in equation [1] .
With this definition, we will not be able to capture the impact of each individual treaty, but we will look at the average effect of the accumulation of treaties. The estimated coefficient will be the average effect of an additional air pollutant treaty on a country's level of CO 2 emissions. From Figure 1 , it can be seen that the variable LRTAP varies over time and between countries.
Timing Effects
To analyze the timing issue, we refer to Table 3, which reports the dates at which emissions targets foreseen in agreements should be met and the year by which a treaty has been ratified by 50% of member countries. It is possible that the effect of an agreement does not occur immediately after its ratification, that is, targets should not be met right after the ratification, and implementing domestic air pollution control policies may take time. To try to remedy this problem, we change the point in time from which a treaty has an impact on emissions by using alternative definitions of the LRTAP variable: (1) a treaty has an impact after it enters into force and (2) a treaty has an impact t years after its ratification (where t = 1 . . . 4).
The last timing issue concerns the Kyoto Protocol. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) show that domestic CO 2 emissions in committed countries were reduced by about 7% after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, while the share of imported over domestic emissions in those committed countries increased by about 14%. As our sample period covers the period during which the Kyoto Protocol was adopted (1997) and ratified (mainly 2002), this may have an impact on our results. We discuss this issue in the sensitivity analysis.
Persistence of CO 2 Emissions
Equation [1] is in some sense static. Due to the substantial inertia of the dependent variable, it is plausible to assume that this year's CO 2 emissions are dependent on the CO 2 emissions of previous years. This is why we introduce a lagged dependent variable in our model:
[2]
is the coefficient of the lagged dependent ρ variable. The coefficients of the explanatory variables, and , have different interpreta-β γ tions compared to the previous basic static specification. They are the estimated responses of CO 2 emissions to changes in the explanatory variables, after controlling for the response for the previous years.
Some econometric problems arise from estimating equation [2] : CO 2 may be nonstationary and the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. The coefficients of the regressors may thus be seriously biased when estimating equation [2] with ordinary least squares. Note, however, that this bias decreases when the number of periods becomes large. Taking the first difference transformation and using the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator allows us to avoid these problems:
where is instrumented using lags Δlog(CO ) 2 it 2 to 4 of . log(CO ) 2 it Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that the AH estimator, while consistent, fails to exploit all the information available in the sample. For this reason, we also estimate equation [3] using the Arellano-Bond estimator.
Dealing with Endogeneity
CO 2 emissions may depend on many other factors that are not included in our control variables. As some of these omitted variables may drive both CO 2 emissions and the decision to ratify a LRTAP treaty, our results may be biased. By using a two-way fixed effects model, we control for unobservable countryheterogeneity and common time varying effects, but some omitted variables may vary across countries and over time (e.g., a country's level of concern about environmental issues or the amount of foreign direct investments in that country). For example, foreign direct investments will have an impact on a country's level of CO 2 emissions. At the same time, the pollution haven hypothesis predicts that, as foreign direct investments provide economic benefits to the host country, this country may be reluctant to ratify additional Death penalty abolished for all crimes 9 32 70 a "De facto" means that a country still has the death penalty in its constitution but has not called on it for at least 10 years and/or that there is a moratorium on the death penalty.
air pollution agreements, which would impose stricter environmental regulations and would drive these foreign direct investments out of the country. 13 Furthermore, even if LRTAP treaties are not targeted toward CO 2 emissions, there may also exist a reverse causality problem between these two variables. Air pollutants covered by LRTAP treaties are very often emitted together with CO 2 , which implies that large CO 2 emitters can also emit large amounts of conventional air pollutants. These large emitters would incur the greatest cost of reducing emissions. As air pollutants can travel some hundreds kilometers before deposition, these countries do not necessarily enjoy the entire environmental benefits of their actions and may be reluctant to ratify LRTAP treaties.
To deal with these problems, we use an instrumental variable approach. Our instrument is an index measuring the status of the death penalty. It is constructed as follows: 14 we measure the status of the death penalty on a five-point scale (0-4), from constitutional authorization of the death penalty (0) to abolition of the death penalty for any offense in both peace and war periods (4) (see Table 4 for details on scores).
We argue that this is a valid instrument for the four following reasons that will be detailed below: (1) it is a relevant instrument to mea-sure the propensity of a country to ratify air pollution agreements, (2) the status of the death penalty does not affect the level of CO 2 emissions, (3) the level of CO 2 emissions does not influence the countries' decisions about the death penalty, and (4) the index varies sufficiently over time and across countries.
First, the pace at which a country ratifies international environmental agreements may be explained by its universalism, in other words, the meta-ethical conviction that some system of ethics applies universally (e.g., for every individual, independently of his culture, religion, nationality, sexuality, and so forth). Indeed, a country that is strongly universalist will be keener to ratify international agreements related to public goods, because these treaties are ways to apply this system of ethics universally. Our idea is to use universalism as an instrument for treaties' ratification that is not directly related to CO 2 emissions. We believe that the pace at which the death penalty is abolished and also the legalization of homosexual marriage or euthanasia can be seen as symbols, and therefore as proxies, for progressive or universalist societies.
Second, this instrument does not affect the level of CO 2 emissions directly, and it is obviously not caused by the level of CO 2 emissions. However, there may be a concern that the abolition of the death penalty might be driven by economic development, which in turn correlates with CO 2 emissions. We believe this should not be a major concern. On the one hand, we control for economic development in our analysis through our control variable GDP. On the other hand, there is some anecdotal evidence that this is not always the case: the United States and Japan, Index, 1970 Index, -2010 which are already very developed countries (they are among the countries with the highest GDP per capita levels in our database) both still constitutionally authorize the death penalty, while the Ivory Coast and Honduras, which are at an early stage of development have de facto abolished the death penalty since the 1960s. 15 On a more rigorous level, Neumayer (2008) estimates that the most important determinants of abolition are political and that economic development does not matter for domestic death penalty abolition (see also Greenberg and West 2008) . Note that we will test for the strength of our instrument in the results section. These tests will confirm us in our choice of the death penalty as an instrument.
Finally, to be a good instrument in the context of panel data, there must be sufficient heterogeneity among countries regarding the abolition of the death penalty, and the index must also vary over time. 16 As shown in Table  5 , in nearly 70% of countries, the status of the death penalty has changed at least once between 1970 and 2008. The status of the death penalty also varies across countries (see Table  4 ). Moreover, the average death penalty index seems to vary significantly over time, as shown by Figure 2 . 17 15 We also check that the correlation coefficient between GDP and our index of the death penalty is very low (e.g., 0.17). 16 Due to the lack of variations through time and across countries, we were not able to use legalization of homosexual marriage or euthanasia as instruments. 17 We also reject the null hypothesis of no variation through time within a country, as the F-statistic is F(38,5662) = 88.69 (with a p-value of 0.00).
III. RESULTS

Individual Agreements
As an illustration, we first estimate equation [1] for each individual agreement k (k = 1 . . . 7) in Table 1 . 18 We present only the results for the variables of interest in Figure   k X it − 1 3. 19 It appears that all the LRTAP treaties have a significant negative impact on CO 2 emissions. Furthermore, their effects are relatively similar. However, as mentioned above, due to the substantial overlap in terms of membership and timing, the impact of each individual treaty will not be estimated accurately. This is why in the next section we turn to models in which agreements are grouped into one variable that counts the number of agreements ratified by each country, LRTAP. ing the Huber-White sandwich estimator, clustered at the country level. Results are shown in the first two columns. The last three columns refer to equation [3] . In these last three columns, standard errors are also clustered at the country level.
Accumulation of Treaties
In column 1 of Table 6 (static specification), the ratification by one country of each additional LRTAP agreement is associated with a reduction of approximately 4% of its CO 2 emissions. When we turn to a dynamic model, results in column 2 suggest a strong inertia in CO 2 emissions, since the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is . The effect of LRTAP agreementŝ ρ = 0.793 is still negative and statistically significant. Note that this is a short-term effect, that is, the effect after controlling for the response of the previous years.
As noted in the previous section, some econometric problems arise from estimating equation [2] : CO 2 emissions may be nonstationary and the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. We run some panel unit root tests. Results are shown in Table 7. For all the tests, we reject the null hypothesis of the existence of unit roots in all panels. Our initial dynamic fixed effects model would thus be fine, as the bias of the autoregressive term would be negligible given the relatively long time span of the data. However, when we run country-specific panel unit root tests, we find that about 21% of panels contain a unit root. 20 For this reason, we turn to the model in first difference, namely, equation [3] , estimated using the AH estimator (Table 6 , columns 3 and 4) and the Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator (column 5). In column 3, we instrument only the lagged dependent variable in first difference ( ) using lags 2 to 4 in level, Δlog(CO ) 2 it that is, for k = 2, 3, 4. In column log(CO ) 2 it− k 4, we deal with the problem of endogeneity by assuming that treaties' ratification may be endogenous and by instrumenting the differenced LRTAP variable ( ) with ΔLRTAP it − 1 the death penalty index in level. In columns 3 to 5 of Table 6 , the coefficient of LRTAP remains negative and significantly different from zero. The value obtained with the AH estimator when treaties' ratification is also instrumented (column 4), seems too high: each additional treaty ratified by one country reduces the CO 2 emissions in that country by approximately 9%. As mentioned earlier, the AH estimator fails to exploit all the information available in the sample, and the coefficient of interest may be very imprecisely estimated in column 4. The AB estimator in column 5 provides a more efficient estimator than AH, and we will consider it as our final result.
The effect of LRTAP is negative and significant at the level of 5%: on average, ratification of an additional treaty has a short-term impact of 2.4% on CO 2 emissions, that is, after controlling for the response of previous years. Obviously, the estimated coefficients in the dynamic and static models are not directly comparable. However, in the dynamic specification, the cumulative effect of an agreement on CO 2 emissions can be computed as , where is the short-β/(1 − ρ) β = − 0.024 term coefficient and is the coeffi-ρ = 0.706 cient of the lagged dependent variable. With our estimates, this cumulative effect is thus equal to approximately 8.2% for LRTAP treaties, suggesting that the effect estimated with the static specification (4%) was probably underestimated.
To the best of our knowledge, there do not exist tests of the strength of instruments in AB models. We rely on the results of the firststage AH estimator as is generally done in the literature. To test for the validity of our instruments, we first look at the first-stage equations of the model in column 4, which are given by 
for j = 1, 2, where
log(CO 2 ) it − 1 and DP it − 1 is the death penalty index. 21 Column 1 in Table 8 shows the results for and column 2 for Δlog(CO ) 2 it − 1 . The death penalty seems to be ΔLRTAP it − 1 a good determinant of the ratification of LRTAP agreements. 22 The strength of the instruments (the lagged dependent variable in level and the status of the death penalty) is further checked with tests presented in Table  9 . Instruments are quite strong. Indeed, we are sure to 95% that the maximal bias associated with the coefficient of interest is less than 10% of the ordinary least squares bias (weak identification test). 23 From the underidentification 21 We also recode the death penalty variable and generate a set of four dummy variables that we use as instruments. Results do not change. 22 Note that this result cannot be explained by an eventual common positive trend (i.e., the fact that both LRTAP and DP increase monotonically), as we use the status of the death penalty in level to instrument LRTAP in first-difference. 23 Even if the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is much higher than the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F-statistic, the use of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is more appropriate. It generalizes the Cragg-Donald statistic to the case of noni.i.d. errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and/or cluster robust statistics. test, we can conclude that the first-stage equation is identified, in other words, the excluded instruments (Death Penalty and lags 2 and 4 of ) are relevant (correlated with the log(CO ) 2 endogenous regressor). 24 We also present the AB tests for AR(1) and AR(2) (See Table 10 ), for which the null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation in the error term. AR(1) is expected in first differences, because the differenced error terms in t and t − 1 both contain the term. To ε it check if our instruments in levels are good instruments for the first-difference, we need to look at AR(2). Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments) are in fact endogenous, thus bad instruments. As shown 24 However, lags 3 and 4 of are not statistically log(CO ) 2 significant in the first-stage equation. in Table 10 , we cannot reject that our instruments in level are valid instruments. 25 Finally, for the other results, most of the control variables have the expected sign. A higher GDP level is associated with higher CO 2 emissions. The coefficients of trade openness and population are positive but not significant. The shares of both agricultural and industrial production imply an increase of CO 2 emissions, but they do not have a significant impact. Democracy has a positive effect on CO 2 emissions (but significant only at the 10% level). The GDP growth rate coefficient has a negative sign in the static specification of Table 10 , but a positive sign in the dynamic specifications (indicating increases in energy consumption that seem to offset energy efficiency improvements during periods of economic growth). 26 25 A potential weakness of the AB estimator (and thus also the AH estimator) is that the lagged levels may be rather poor instruments for first-differenced variables. This is especially the case if the dependent variable is close to a unit root, which seems not to be the case here, sinceρ = 0.706 (see column 5). In the presence of poor instruments in level, one could use the augmented version: system generalized method of moments (GMM). The system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond) uses the level equation (e.g., equation
[2] in our case). The variables in levels in the second equation are instrumented with their own first differences. However, using this method in a panel with fixed effects requires a new assumption: the first-differenced variables used as instruments for the variables in levels should not be correlated with the unobserved country effects in equation [2] . In α i our case, this would require, for example, that the first-differenced death penalty index or GDP is not correlated with the fixed-effects capturing unobserved heterogeneity among countries, which is too strong an assumption. Moreover, as the first-stage regression and the Stock and Yogo's test show, our instruments are not weak. 26 Given that the dynamic model seems to be the appropriate specification for the process underlying CO 2 emissions, the coefficient estimated in the dynamic model seems more reliable.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
The record of recent climate negotiations (e.g., Cancun, Copenhagen) demonstrates that an ambitious climate change agreement is very difficult to achieve. By contrast, pollutants covered by LRTAP agreements (SO 2 , NO x , or VOCs) are local pollutants whose regulation has larger and more visible shortterm health benefits (Burtraw et al. 2001 ) than the long-term benefits obtainable through climate change measures (e.g., due to more substantial discounting). Treaties on these types of pollutants will thus be easier to reach and lead to a higher commitment by politicians. However, this does not imply that policy makers should concentrate only on these local pollutants and completely forego achieving selfenforcing international agreements on CO 2 emissions.
Our results show that, even if they are not directly targeted toward CO 2 emissions, each additional LRTAP treaty is associated with an annual reduction of CO 2 emissions of approximately 2.4%, and this effect accumulates overtime (i.e., 8.2% in the long term). How can we interpret this estimate in terms of the future CO 2 emissions reductions that some countries want to implement?
In advance of the Conference of the Parties in Paris (COP21), some countries have submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) containing, implicitly or explicitly, emissions reduction commitments. For example, the United States has pledged to cut net greenhouse gas emissions by 26% to 28% (relative to 2005 levels) by 2025, while the European Union has pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% (relative to 1990 levels) by 2030 (IEA 2015) . Relative to 2008 levels (the last year of our sample), these objectives correspond to a reduction in emissions of 24% by 2025 for the United States and 36.5% by 2030 for the European Union.
In order to evaluate the impact of the LRTAP treaties, we can compute what would have been the emissions in the absence of these agreements (assuming a yearly reduction of 2.4%, which accumulates over time), for each country and each year of our sample. Another way to interpret our results is in terms of the remaining carbon budget. According to a recent report released by the IEA (2015), with the INDC submitted for the COP21, the world's estimated remaining carbon budget consistent with a 50% chance of keeping the rise in temperature below 2 degrees Celsius will be consumed by around 2040. If we assume that a new LRTAP agreement is ratified by all countries in 2015, then in 2040, the world will have saved at least 7.4% of its carbon budget. 28 In view of these examples, the impact of LRTAP treaties on CO 2 emissions is nonnegligible but clearly not large enough to rely only on these policies to solve the climate change issue. An international self-enforcing agreement with CO 2 emissions reduction targets will still be necessary. Nevertheless, the abatement complementarity between CO 2 emissions and conventional air pollutants identified in this paper may have some implications regarding the design of the future climate change policies. Namely, it provides an empirical argument to jointly negotiate on regional and global pollution issues at the next COP. This could be particularly relevant for developing countries with sizeable CO 2 emissions, the participation of which is essential to reaching an efficient climate agreement. If these countries also suffer domestically from bad air quality, the incentive to control conventional air pollutants will be strong. For example, adopting acid rain control measures could lead to substantial ancillary benefits in terms of CO 2 emissions, which may help these countries reach CO 2 targets more easily.
An example of how to implement this combination of policies has been proposed by Caplan and Silva (2005) . They theoretically show how a global permit market can be linked with regional permit markets to control local pollutants and how this may lead to a Pareto superior outcome that is self-enforcing. In their model, there are abatement complementarities between the local and global pollutants and, with an international joint permit market, the emissions caps on both pollutants in each region will take into account these complementarities.
V. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we test the robustness of our benchmark results, namely, that the ratification of each additional air pollution treaty is associated with a significant reduction of CO 2 emissions. All the results in this section are obtained by estimating equation [3] using the AB estimator. Details of these robustness checks can be found in Appendix B. They are summarized below. 29
Timing Issues
As our main result may be sensitive to the choice of the point in time from which a treaty has an impact on emissions, we have reestimated the model using alternative definitions of the variable of interest. Results are not reported in full but are available upon request (see Appendix Tables B1 and B2 ). We first consider that the effects of a treaty do not occur immediately, but only k years after its ratification (for k = 2, 3, 4): the new variable of interest is . Second, we use entry LRTAP it − k into force rather than ratification as the point in time from which a treaty has an impact on CO 2 emissions. The results are similar compared to those in column 5 of Table 6 : the short-term impact of LRTAP agreements is still negative and significant. 30
Including Other Agreements
We also test whether our result is really driven by treaty ratifications or whether only the participation in the LRTAP Convention matters (see Appendix Table B3 ): 31 we substitute the variable LRTAP it by a dummy variable Convention it , which is equal to 1 if country i has ratified the convention by time t. The impact of the convention is negative but not significant.
Initially, we excluded from our analysis the 1984 EMEP treaty because it required only that countries report their emissions to the treaty secretariat. However, one might suggest that transparency (achieved through emissions reporting) is a key factor to achieve explicit reduction targets. We therefore modify the variable LRTAP it by including ratification of the 1984 EMEP treaty. The impact remains significant and is a little bit higher than our main result (-0.026 instead of -0.024). This could suggest that the simple obligation of reporting has contributed to emission reductions achieved by the LRTAP treaties.
Effect of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol was ratified during the period analyzed in this paper (most ratifications occurred in 2002). 32 As a consequence, some CO 2 emissions reductions at the end of our sample period may potentially be due to the Kyoto Protocol. To control for this, we estimate our model for two different sample periods: (1) before the adoption of the Kyoto 30 The reason is that due to the setting of LRTAP treaties, ratification and entry into force coincide (almost to the year) for many countries in our sample.
31 This is the 1979 LRTAP Convention under the auspices of which all subsequent protocols are negotiated. 32 In our dataset, 28 countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. Three countries ratified it before 2002: Cyprus (1999) and Czech Republic and Romania (2001) . Protocol (1970 Protocol ( -1997 and (2) before its ratification . Results (not reported in full) are similar (and even stronger) compared to those in column 5 of Table 6 (see Appendix  Table B4 ).
Other Set of Controls
Environmental agreements might affect the level of imports/exports (our measure of trade openness), and as it is included as control variables, our results may be biased. Moreover, the coefficients of some of our control variables (e.g., proportion of agriculture in GDP, growth rate or logMEA) are not significant. As shown in Appendix Table B5 , omitting these control variables does not change the main results (the size and the significance of the results are even higher). Other control variables (e.g., the amount of foreign direct investments or the proportion of electricity production from natural gas sources, which is less sulfur and carbon intensive than coal, for example) were also introduced in the AB specification, but this did not change the main results of the model (see Appendix Table B5 , columns 3 and 4). Other variables would have been interesting to study, such as the legal origin (Stern 2012) . However, these variables do not vary over time and are likely to be captured by the fixed effects or to disappear when we turn to the AH or AB estimations.
Subsamples of Countries
We test whether our benchmark results are driven by a particular subsample of countries. The thrust of our argument continues to hold (see Appendix Table B6 ). Air pollution agreements have a negative impact on CO 2 emissions, whatever the subsample considered: (1) without the biggest SO 2 emitters (United States, United Kingdom, Poland, Spain, and Germany), (2) without the countries that were the most affected by acid rain before the ratification of the LRTAP agreements (Scandinavian countries), 33 and (3) without economies in transition. 34
Net CO 2 Emissions
Our data on CO 2 emissions do not take into account emissions/removals from land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF). The data used in this paper are thus gross CO 2 emissions. However, there are examples of countries, such as Russia, that have reduced their gross CO 2 emissions and at the same time have destroyed substantial parts of their forest area, thereby increasing their net CO 2 emissions. In this case, emissions reductions are overestimated, since the destruction of forests, which are carbon sinks, increases the stock of CO 2 in the atmosphere. In order to get an idea of the effect of air pollution agreements on net CO 2 emissions, we remove from our sample the countries with the highest deforestation rates. 35 In other countries, the gross CO 2 emissions (our data) should be very similar to net emissions, and the coefficient of the variable of interest for those countries should thus not be affected by the fact that we do not take into account removals by LU-LUCF. The results in Appendix Table B6 show that the effect is similar but a little bit smaller (-0.02 rather than -0.024) when we remove the countries with the highest deforestation rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to test for the effectiveness of air pollution agreements on ages from transboundary acid rains, and they were the first to adopt control on SO 2 emissions (primarily to encourage others to follow rather than to benefit directly). 34 The reduction of emissions observed in countries with economies in transition in the 1990s is mainly due to the economic collapse in former Soviet states. It can then be argued that the success of air pollution agreements in reducing CO 2 emissions is an artifact of those transition countries' industrial restructuring. 35 This information comes from http://www.grida.no.
the level of CO 2 emissions. There is strong evidence that CO 2 (a global pollutant) is often released with more conventional air pollutants. Pollution abatements imposed by international treaties targeted to these conventional pollutants may thus jointly reduce the flows of both types of pollutants. Our analysis focuses on the effects of the treaties that follow the 1979 LRTAP Convention. We deal with different issues pertaining to the identification of the effect of these multiple agreements: endogeneity, timing effects, and time and membership overlap between treaties. The main result is that LRTAP agreements, even if they are not CO 2 specific, have a statistically significant negative impact on CO 2 emissions. This puts forward the limitation of studying the effects of an environmental agreement in isolation. This also suggests that these two pollution issues could be tackled together at the international level in order to take these ancillary benefits into account in future policy targets. This paper is a first attempt to study the ancillary effects of multiple air pollution treaties empirically. We identify potential ancillary benefits of LRTAP treaties for climate change issues. However, climate change is a very complex problem, and this study can be extended in several ways. Among other things, LRTAP treaties are also expected to have an impact on SO 2 emissions, which are turned into sulfate aerosols. They have only a short lifetime in the atmosphere but have a substantial cooling effect and can thus postpone the impact of climate change (Tol 2004) . SO 2 reductions due to LRTAP treaties may thus partially offset carbon emissions reductions by those treaties. This example shows that in order to design an optimal international climate policy, it is crucial to understand and estimate all the interactions between air pollution and climate treaties and their respective outcomes. a k = 1 is our main result from column 5 in Table 6 . ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared = squared correlation between the observed and predicted level of the dependent variable. Column 1, without biggest emitters; column 2, without most-affected countries; column 3, no economies in transition; column 4, no deforestation. ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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